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Highlights 
 
¥ Technological practice cannot and does not let objects be. 
¥ This leads to an increase in the cumulative matter/energy throughput. 
¥ To achieve degrowth, throughput must reduce. 
¥ Releasement of objects leads to a reduction in throughput. 
¥ An ethos of releasement is needed to degrowth. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The large-scale ecological damage caused by growth societies calls for economic 
degrowth in terms of a radical decrease in matter/energy throughput. This article 
examines the role of modern technology in degrowth with a focus on the question of 
agency and its ethical implications. After conceptualising technology as practice, the 
paper finds that while technological practice encompasses an agency for social 
change, it is restricted to transforming the non-human world to human-made objects. 
This is because in technological practice the world and its objects unfold as a 
standing-reserve for human use. Due to this calculative and anthropocentric 
thinking, technological practice does not and cannot support the emergence of a kind 
of agency that either does or can let things be. Moreover, the more technological the 
practice, the more objects are utilised. The paper concludes that technological 
practice does not support the transition to degrowth, because it directs its agents 
towards the continuous transformation of non-human-made objects into human-
made objects resulting in an increase in cumulative throughput. The paper thus 
suggests that an ethos of releasement is needed to attain, as well as to live in, a 
degrowth society. The rationale provided for refraining from the technological 
practice in order to contribute to ecologically sensible social change is the chief 
contribution of this paper. 
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1. Introduction 
 
At the dawn of eco-modernisation, which unfortunately seems to succeed the post-
modern age, technology is assigned a central role in attempts to solve global and 
local ecological problems (UN, 2012; IPCC, 2014; EC, 2015). In line with 
suggestions made by ecological modernisation theorists (e.g. Mol and Spaargaren, 
2000; Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000; Jnicke, 2008), vast amounts of time and energy 
are directed towards research, and the development and innovation of new, greener 
or cleaner products and processes. Measured in economic terms, global investments 
in (so-called) clean energy, for instance, reached USD 318 billion in 2014 (BNEF, 
2015). Once it reaches its fullest potential by directing sufficient capital to the 
brightest minds of the planet, it is believed that the technological revolution will 
deliver solutions to the most challenging problems of our time. 
 
Within the prevalent system of capitalism, where the accumulation of economic 
capital must never be jeopardised (Boltanski and Chiapello [1999] 2005; Latouche, 
[2007] 2009), solutions to the escalating ecological crisis have become narrowly 
defined as means of decoupling (N¾ss and H¿yer, 2009). This decoupling embeds 
an idea that further economic growth would not necessarily result in ecological 
harm, if more modern technology manifests rapidly enough. There is, however, 
strong empirical and theoretical evidence on the correlation, as well as on the 
causality, of economic growth and ecological destruction (Naess, [1974] 1989; Daly, 
1979; 1996; IPCC, 2014). It is broadly acknowledged in ecological economics that 
the expansion of economic activity signifies a greater use of natural resources and a 
greater volume of greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. Victor, 2008; Jackson, 2009). The 
success claimed for decoupling economic growth from ecological damage is based 
on selected data in terms of geographical context (see e.g. Zhang, 2000; Tapio, 
2005; de Freitas and Kaneko, 2011). The problem with such research designs is that 
the outsourced production (input) and exportation of waste (output) to other 
countries are excluded from the calculus. As demonstrated by Wiedmann et al. 
(2015), when examining decoupling with the global material flow data, the reported 
achievement per country is considerably less than assumed, and is even in some 
cases non-existent. 
 
Due to the lack of robust evidence in absolute decoupling (Daly, 1996; Victor, 2008; 
Jackson, 2009), there is a call for a transition from growth economies to degrowth 
societies in order to achieve sustainability (Martnez-Alier et al., 2010; Cattaneo et 
al., 2012; Sekulova et al., 2013; Kallis et al., 2012; DÕAlisa et al., 2014). In this 
scenario, instead of building up expectations and furthering ungrounded optimism in 
technological progress, the economies of the world would be downsized to the 
extent that their resource use and waste do not exceed the regenerative and/or 
assimilative capacities of the planetary ecosystem (Daly, 1996; Dietz and OÕNeill, 
2013). Given the extremely inequitable distribution of affluence (Piketty, 2014) and 
the relatively small reduction potential in the South (UNEP, 2011), degrowth would 
have to begin in the wealthiest economies of the world (Georgescu-Roegen, 1975; 
Daly, 1996; Latouche, [2007] 2009) and comprise affluence reductions in both 
macro and micro level economies. 
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Since degrowth1 signifies that Ôsocieties will use fewer natural resourcesÕ (Kallis et 
al., 2014, p. 3), it also necessitates challenging capitalism as a political-economic 
regime based on accumulation (Foster, 2011; Boltanski and Chiapello [1999] 2005) 
or any other form of Ôgrowth society based upon the development of productive 
forcesÕ (Latouche, [2007] 2009, p. 89). It goes without saying that social change of 
this magnitude would be difficult. Twenty-first century hubris, manifesting as the 
deep-rooted self-confidence of humans to engineer planet Earth (Hamilton, 2013) 
combined with capitalistic hegemony and the power of corporations (Suarez-Villa, 
2009), ensure that a global transition to degrowth would be close to impossible. 
Nevertheless, several small communities, operating with diverse drivers, have 
started to practise alternatives to growth societies (Joubert and Dregger, 2015, see 
also GEN, 2016). In line with what Kallis et al. (2014) listed as the primary 
significations of what a degrowth society might look like, these organisations are 
practising voluntary simplicity, conviviality and care by means of cooperation and 
sharing. 
 
However, perhaps the most controversial question in both the practice and theory of 
degrowth concerns the question of technology. What kind of needs are there for 
technology in a degrowth society and on the route to achieving it? For example, is it 
necessary to communicate via the internet, or to travel by aeroplane? Some 
communication and travel is necessary, but how much technology is actually needed 
to maintain contact and to provide an occasional change of scenery? For instance, 
would it be enough to use video calls once a year and travel to distant destinations 
once a decade? Alternatively, what kind of technology is necessary to fulfil needs in 
a degrowth society? Might people connect by using the telephone and mail instead 
of high-tech services such as Skype and WhatsApp (be they commercial or open-
source)? Or, might people talk face-to-face, or travel on foot to meetings? Would 
these satisfy the needs related to communication and travel in a degrowth society? 
Moreover, are they adequate practices to ignite the global degrowth transition? 
These questions, and many others related to technology, are highly important to the 
degrowth movement, and must certainly be answered sooner rather than later. 
 
For one of the (arguably) greatest philosophers of technology in the twentieth 
century, Martin Heidegger, the above-mentioned examples would perhaps only 
qualify as ontic questions as they are concerned with situational, tangible and 
specific matters of technology (Heidegger, [1927] 1962). In order to clarify the 
phenomenon of technology, an enquiry must also enter the ontological realm that 
underlies the ontical. This signifies that before dealing with the more situational 
questions, the objective of a study should be to examine the essence of technology: 
 
We are questioning concerning technology in order to bring to light our 
relationship to its essence. The essence of modern technology shows itself in 
what we call Enframing. But simply to point to this is still no way to answer 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
 This study employs a rather minimalistic definition of degrowth. Degrowth is first and foremost 
used to refer to the reduction of the size of an economy, which is measured in matter/energy 
throughput. The degrowth movement, however, is not limited to this definition but encompasses a 
wider perspective on cultural change (e.g., Latouche, [2007] 2009). 
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the question concerning technology, if to answer means to respond, in the 
sense of correspond, to the essence of what is being about. 
 
Where do we find ourselves brought to, if now we think one step further 
regarding what Enframing itself actually is? It is nothing technological, nothing 
on the order of a machine. It is the way in which the real reveals itself as 
standing-reserve. (Heidegger, ([1952Ð1962] 1977, p. 23). 
 
Following the call for an in-depth investigation into the essence of technology, this 
paper first aims to gain an understanding of the phenomenon of technology and then 
to analyse its suitability for ecologically sensible social change. The paper asks what 
technology is (in a more ontological sense) and how apt technology is to prompt 
degrowth (in ontic terms). The focus of the enquiry is on agency embedded in 
technology and its ethical significance. The paper begins by discussing the 
ecological problems of growth economies and the necessity of transition to 
degrowth societies; it also describes the possibilities for and sources of social 
change from a practice-theoretical perspective (espoused mainly by Theodore 
Schatzki). To begin bridging the ontological and ontic levels in the study of 
technology, modern technology is defined through its essence as Enframing, 
following Heidegger. Enframing manifests as the technological practice of varying 
degrees (similarly with Alan Drengson). The paper proceeds to examine the agency 
entrenched in the technological practice and the ethical relevance of technology for 
degrowth. Before the concluding remarks, the paper discusses an alternative, namely 
the ethos of releasement (Heidegger, [1959] 1966; Zimmerman, 1983; Introna, 
2009), which is suggested to offer a suitable normative basis for the degrowth 
movement in the process of developing alternative social practices. 
 
 
2. Towards Degrowth Societies 
 
This section briefly reviews the main causes and mechanisms of ecological damage 
(2.1.), as well as the main measure of destruction, namely matter/energy throughput 
(2.2.), and by doing so presents a case for the degrowth transition from the 
ecological point of view. The possibilities for social change are then postulated 
through a practice-theoretical lens. 
 
2.1. Ecological Damage 
 
Since the Industrial Revolution, the global biosphere and its local ecosystems have 
undergone drastic changes in terms of rising temperatures and a reduction in 
biodiversity as the consequence of rapid warming and habitat destruction 
(Zalasiewicz et al., 2008; Barnosky et al., 2012). The principal causes of global 
warming are anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, which are in turn undesired 
outcomes of economic and population growth (IPCC, 2014) Ð particularly the 
former (UNEP, 2011; Lorek and Spangenberg, 2014). Economic growth has meant 
increasing demands for food, mobility, housing, and other goods and services 
(Latouche, [2007] 2009; Jackson, 2009). The production of the mounting needs and 
wants has led not only to growing pressure on the atmosphere through emissions, 
but also to growing pressure on land and water signifying habitats being exploited 
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for production purposes (Barnosky et al., 2012). During the period of fierce 
industrial growth, Ô[a]nnual global resource extraction and use increased from about 
7 billion tons (7 Gt) in 1900 to about 55 billion tons (55 Gt) in 2000, with the main 
shift being from renewable biotic resources to non-renewable mineral onesÕ (UNEP, 
2011, p. 17). The expansion of human activities has also signified the transformation 
of the terrestrial biosphere into anthromes (Ellis, 2011), or human-made objects, 
Ôpassing the 50% mark early in the 20th centuryÕ (Ellis et al., 2010). For example, 
Ôabout 40% of all ice-free land on Earth is in direct use for agriculture or urban 
settlementsÕ and Ô[a]n additional 37% of ice-free land is not currently used for these 
purposes, but is embedded within anthromes having these usesÕ (Ellis et al., 2010, p. 
603). Hence, it is rather apparent that the consequences of industrial production have 
been global and detrimental for the ecosystemÕs beings. 
 
Economic growth has been empowered by the advances in technology and the 
utilisation of natural resources (Hornborg, 2014), particularly fossil energy 
(Wrigley, 2010). This development, however, is now being confronted as 
ecosystems are setting limits to the expansion of economic activity (Rockstrm et 
al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015). As regards material limits, stocks of non-renewable 
non-human resources are heading towards depletion, and renewable resources (such 
as forests and stocks of fish) are being consumed faster than they can renew (Lorek 
and Spangenberg, 2014). With regard to less tangible limits, again, the atmospheric 
carbon dioxide concentration has been found to be too great and the global nitrogen 
cycle too disrupted to ensure a safe operating space for humanity and other species 
(Rockstrm et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015). These estimates concerning the state 
of the planet are beset by uncertainties, but the principal point is that if humans are 
to steer away from the current worst-case scenario of collapsing ecosystems, social 
practices must be radically reorganised (Goodland and Daly, 1996, also Barnosky et 
al., 2012). 
 
2.2. Throughput 
 
As there are strong indications that economic growth is the main cause of ecological 
destruction, degrowth scholars call for economic downsizing in terms of decreased 
matter/energy throughput (e.g., Schneider et al., 2010; Martnez-Alier et al., 2010; 
Sekulova et al., 2013; Kallis et al., 2012; DÕAlisa et al., 2014). Throughput, of 
which GDP/GNP/GWP is a rough measure (Boulding, 1966), is Ôwhatever flows 
through a system, entering as input and exiting as outputÕ (Daly, 1992, p. 333). For a 
sustainability analysis, the most important inputs are the so-called natural, non-
human resources, while the central outputs are climate emissions and other 
pollution. 
 
It is important to recognise that Ô[t]he global average metabolic rate has doubled 
from 4.6 tons/capita in 1900 to 8Ð9 tons/capita at the beginning of the 21st centuryÕ 
(UNEP, 2011, p. 18). In this metabolic process of going through, finite 
matter/energy travels from states of low entropy to high entropy, and because of 
entropy, humankind cannot rely on resources always being in a form that facilitates 
their easy utilisation (Georgescu-Roegen, 1975). According to the Laws of 
Thermodynamics, all forms of matter and energy become dissipated when used, and 
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are hence become less accessible to the users, humans. In addition to the problems 
of resource scarcity (inputs), the ongoing, fast-paced transformation of objects 
produces waste (output) at a rate that has undesirable ecological consequences. 
When forests are cut down faster than they can renew, it results in deforestation, 
destruction of habitats, and the absence of carbon capture. When stocks of fossil 
fuels are burned in the atmosphere, it results in harmful emissions heating up the 
climate and reduces air quality. The prevailing unsustainability is thus an effect of 
too intense a throughput. In other words, the matter/energy Ôflow beginning with raw 
material inputs, followed by their conversion into commodities, and finally into 
waste outputsÕ is not Ôwithin the regenerative and absorptive capacities of the 
ecosystemÕ (Daly, 1996, p. 28), underlining the urgency of the need for economic 
degrowth. 
 
Schneider et al. (2010, p. 511) Ôdistinguish between depression, i.e. unplanned 
degrowth within a growth regime, and sustainable degrowth, a voluntary, smooth 
and equitable transition to a regime of lower production and consumptionÕ. In 
physical terms (physis), a degrowth society is one whose throughput is made to 
decrease in order to avoid the depletion of natural, non-human resources (input) 
beyond their regenerative capacity, and to avoid pollution (output) beyond the 
absorptive capacity of the bioregion. So, unlike growth economies, a high 
throughput is not desired in a degrowth society Ð instead, it is Ôregarded as 
something to be minimized rather than maximizedÕ (Boulding, 1966, p. 9). 
Moreover, since the reduction in throughput is incompatible with further economic 
growth, it will entail, in all likelihood, economic degrowth (Kallis, 2011). An ever-
decreasing throughput, or degrowth, is not, of course, an end in itself, but a means to 
a sustainable society (see Kerschner, 2010). In order to reach sustainability, 
degrowth societies are a necessary form of organisation, which those economies 
whose throughput exceeds the sustainable level must enter. 
 
2.3. Agency for Social Change 
 
The idea of the degrowth society is exceptionally revolutionary as it signifies a 
large-scale cultural change, including changes in social structures, values, and 
practices (Latouche, [2007] 2009). The transition is considered to be far from simple 
as it touches upon the very fundamentals of the contemporary social organisation, 
including the understanding of how this social change could take place. 
 
The question of agency Ð the performance of doing and saying (Schatzki, 2002, 
p. 240) Ð is assumed to be crucial in understanding change and the opportunities it 
offers. The notion of agency is often used to refer to an actorÕs ability and/or 
capacity to act in a specific situation by overcoming the structural and institutional 
constraints of the surroundings. While agency is conventionally theorised as a 
privilege of the rational human individual2, contemporary social studies stretch 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Plumwood (2001) argues that the over-emphasis of human agency and under-emphasis of non-human agency is 
a trait of an anthropocentric culture: ÔHegemonic conceptions of human agency are fostered in human-centered 
culture; these are linked to denials of dependency, which in turn are linked to the application of inappropriate 
!
! 7 
agency to include collective entities (Lockie, 2004; Vincent, 2008; Schwinn, 2008) 
and non-human actors (Johnson [aka Latour], 1988; Barad, 2014), as well as to 
humanÐnonhuman assemblages (Bennett, 2010). Moreover, the source of agency is 
often situated in social practices, instead of simply attempting to explain change as a 
product of either the individual agentÕs traits or the structures surrounding the agent 
(e.g. Bourdieu, [1972] 1977; Giddens, 1984). ÔAll social action is a concrete 
synthesis, shaped and conditioned, on the one hand, by the temporal-relational 
contexts of action and, on the other, by the dynamic element of agency itselfÕ 
(Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p. 1004). 
 
Taking a practice-theoretical view, social change is hence neither considered to be 
merely an outcome of the internal drivers of an agent, nor something caused by the 
external forces of social structures (Shove et al., 2012): Rather, change is fabricated 
in the practices of (more or less) amalgamated human and non-human agents that act 
within (more or less) amalgamated material and non-material structures. In other 
words, social practices are neither fully determined by structures nor fully free of 
them Ð making the old tug-of-war between proponents of free will and determinism 
unnecessary (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). When agency is entrenched in practice, 
the opportunity for social change lies in the emergence, reproduction, and 
disappearance of practices making Ôeach present activity É potentially a new start, 
potentially itself a change or the beginning of changeÕ (Schatzki, 2014, p. 17). 
 
Moreover, as the social world is always in the composition alongside materiality 
(Bennett, 2004), the Ôfuture is made in the ceaseless advance of human and non-
human agencyÕ (Schatzki, 2002, p. 210). In other words, agency for change is highly 
relational and embedded in the nexuses of practices, as explained by Schatzki (2014, 
p. 17): 
 
This advance is not, however, a leap into an empty, unfurrowed, isotropic 
space that receives motion in any direction. Agency does not invent the future 
wholesale from its own resources. Instead, it arcs through a variegated and 
folded landscape of variously qualified paths: Agency makes the future within 
an extant mesh of practices and orders that prefigures what it does Ð and 
thereby what it makes Ð by qualifying paths before it. Indeed, the incessant 
advance of agency is the endless happening of the social site, from which 
nascent agency ÒstartsÓ in the twin senses of originating (taking place) at and 
being formed as the doing it is. 
 
This time and place that agency is situated in signifies that different activities embed 
a varying degree of agency that is socio-culturally mediated (Ahern, 2001, p. 109) 
and that each agency Ôvaries considerably in different settings and societiesÕ 
(Knappett and Malafouris, 2008, p. x). That is, agency is always contained within 
practices, and that being so, agencies take shape, and are shaped by, social practices. 
It is important to note here that change to a degrowth society must also reside in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
strategies and forms of rationality that aim to maximize the share of the ÒisolatedÓ self and neglect the need to 
promote mutual flourishingÕ (p. 5). 
!
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social practices rather than merely in the structures or values of agents. What counts 
is the change in practice. 
 
 
3. Theorising Technology as Practice 
 
This section describes the origins and the essence of modern technology as 
Enframing (3.1.) and then proceeds to conceptualise technology as practice (3.2.). 
From this position, the section then analyses the question of agency (3.3.) and ethics 
in technology (3.4.). The section ends by exploring an alternative to technology, 
namely releasement (3.5.). 
 
3.1. The Origins and the Essence of Modern Technology 
 
The question of technology has perplexed sociologists and philosophers for several 
decades. One of the starting points for analysing the social side of technology was 
established by the existential phenomenologist, Martin Heidegger. According to 
Heidegger ([1952Ð1962] 1977, p. 255), technology is not merely a means to achieve 
an end, but also a human activity, Ôa mode of revealingÕ. Despite the instrumental 
definition of technology being correct, Heidegger suggests there is a need for a 
broader phenomenological understanding of technology in order to comprehend its 
essence. 
 
The etymological origins of the word ÔtechnologyÕ can be traced to the Greek notion 
of techne (τέχνη). ÔTo the Greeks techne means neither art nor handicraft but rather: 
to make something appear, within what is present, as this or that, in this way or that 
wayÕ (Heidegger, [1959] 2001, p. 157). ÔTechne is a kind of revealing or bringing 
forthÑpoiesisÑbelonging to craftsmen and poetsÕ (Zimmerman, 1983, p. 108). So 
in the conceptual frame of Heidegger, ancient techne is the know-how that 
corresponds to the activity of poiesis (Di Pippo, 2000), the Ôprecondition for any 
kind of makingÕ (Zimmerman, 1983, p. 108). 
 
Another necessity for making something appear in the activity of techne is physis, or 
phusis (often translated as ÔnatureÕ in English), which forms the matter-energetic 
basis of being. Even though this remark is not explicitly stated in HeideggerÕs 
philosophy, he does consider that Ôtechne and phusis belong essentially togetherÕ (Di 
Pippo, 2000, p. 32). Heidegger Ôexplains that the bringing forth of Being involved in 
human production is ultimately grounded in the bringing forth of phusisÕ (ibid, p. 
32). Moreover, Ôit is through the experience of the poiesis of phusis that human 
production takes its bearings and distinguishes itselfÕ. In summary, techne can be 
considered to refer to the processes of revealing by means of making that is enabled 
by the physical, non-human world. 
 
While the ancient techne was characterised by Heidegger as a sort of poetic 
openness to the world, the modern technology arose from the attempt to control the 
world, and thus Ôdoes not unfold into a bringing forth in the sense of poiesisÕ 
(Heidegger, [1952Ð1962] 1977, p. 14; also p. 131, xxv) but of something else. And 
the more humans began to seek control and believe in their power to master the laws 
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of the non-human world (phusis) by means of technology (techne), the more modern 
the technology became. 
 
In terms of the second precondition for techne, namely the physical basis of any 
activity of revealing, the modern technology follows the ancient description: all 
technological activity requires phusis. Unlike its earlier form, however, technology 
today places on the non-human world an unreasonable demand of supplying 
matter/energy for extraction and storage (see Heidegger, [1952-1962] 1977, p. 14). 
Partly due to this, the speed of bringing forth in the contemporary world has 
increased to an unprecedented level and making has reached a global scale (with 
drilling for oil in every corner of the world and experimenting with geoengineering 
being the most radical examples). 
 
In the lifeworld dominated by technology, all matter/energy is taken as a resource, 
what Heidegger ([1952-1962] 1977, p. 17) aptly calls the Ôstanding-reserveÕ 
[Bestand], and utilised for production. So fundamentally, Ôthe sway of [techne] does 
not consist [only] in manufacturing, but in representing producing, such that what is 
handed over and what is deliverable secures calculating availability of the whole of 
everything with which what is produced right now is interconnected above all 
according to its producednessÕ (Heidegger, [1936-1944] 2006, p. 154-155). It is 
through this constant producing that modern technology pursues its insatiable 
ambition Ôto re-create the worldÕ (Meagher, 1988, p. 163). 
 
The essence of modern technology, according to Heidegger ([1952-1962] 1977), lies 
in Enframing (Ge-stell). This ÔEnframing means the gathering together of that 
setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in 
the mode of ordering, as standing-reserveÕ (ibid, p. 20). Heikker ([2012] 2014, p. 5) 
explains this notion eloquently: 
 
In Martin HeideggerÕs thinking, ÔenframingÕ (Ge-stell) names the framework 
within which Being is revealed during the technological epoch. Enframing 
refers to a way of disclosing the world. There is always such a way: in the 
Middle Ages, Being was unconcealed as creatures in relation to the Creator; in 
the modern age, Being becomes unconcealed as a resource (Bestand) to be 
used. Within enframing, modern science and technology disclose a truth about 
the world, but another way of disclosing would open the world differently. 
 
Following Heidegger, this study defines technology through its ontological essence 
Enframing, a mode of human existence. In the next section, technology is 
conceptualised as practice. This conceptualisation is an important precursor to 
examining the question of agency in technology and the related ethical implications. 
 
3.2. Technological Practice: A Manifestation of Enframing 
 
In a pragmatically-oriented analysis, technology can be, and often is, defined merely 
as an instrument (e.g. Georgescu-Roegen, 1975), which is justifiable; but Heidegger 
([1952Ð1962] 1977, p. 4Ð5) expounded a broader view of technology with 
Enframing, which includes the practices of Ômanufacturing and utilization of 
equipment, tools, and machines, the manufactured and used things themselves, and 
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the needs and ends that they serveÕ. However, as Heidegger directed his main focus 
on to the phenomenal questions of Being and existence, he paid less attention to the 
more practical sphere of technology. Nevertheless, HeideggerÕs early philosophy 
(alongside Ludwig WittgensteinÕs later works) has been considered to offer a central 
philosophical background for the so-called Ôtheories of practiceÕ that analyse the 
social through everyday practices (Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, 2014). Although 
Heidegger can be read as a practice theorist, his view on modern technology was not 
very practice-based. Thus, in order to study the implications of technology, 
HeideggerÕs work on technology should be connected to, and completed with, ontic 
investigations (something that can also be studied empirically). 
 
This study accordingly proceeds to posit that Enframing manifests at the ontic level 
as practice, a technological practice. The term technological practice refers not only 
to the framework where the world unfolds as a standing-reserve but also to the kind 
of activity that emerges in parallel with, and as a consequence of, the mode of 
existence. This technological practice repeats and reinforces Enframing, forming a 
sort of spiral of modernity. But while the technological practice Ôresponds to [É] 
Enframing, [...] it never comprises Enframing itself or brings it aboutÕ, as Heidegger 
([1952-1962] 1977, p. 21) pointed out. Furthermore, Enframing as a human mode of 
being cannot contain or capture the technological practice in its totality as non-
human objects are also involved in the lifeworld. Hence, there is always an element 
of surprise in the manifestation of Being. 
 
3.3. Technology and Theories of Practice 
 
In the task of understanding the role of technology in social change, the 
conceptualisation of technology as practice seems pertinent, as it is not limited to 
scrutinising certain technological instruments from a benefitÐharm calculus (which 
can also be considered a technological practice), but instead allows an enquiry to 
examine what technology (as a whole) is and does. 
 
Theorists of practice have defined technology as a constitutive part of social 
practices. For Reckwitz (2002, p. 249), for instance, a practice is: 
 
a routinized type of behaviour which consists of several elements, 
interconnected to one other: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental 
activities, ÔthingsÕ and their use, a background knowledge in the form of 
understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge. 
 
Technology, from this view, is merely an element of routinized behaviour. 
According to Schatzki (2014, p. 15) the site of the social consists of practices, which 
are Ôopen spatial-temporal nexuses of doings and sayings that are linked by arrays of 
understanding, rules, and end-task-action combinations [...] that are acceptable for or 
enjoined of participantsÕ (Schatzki, 2014, p. 15). In SchatzkiÕs view, technology 
becomes conceptualised through material arrangements that are linked to social 
practices. Whereas Schatzki (2002) sees technology as arrangements that are co-
produced with practices, but are nonetheless distinct from them, Shove et al. (2012) 
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declare a more constitutive role for technology by positioning it as an element of 
social practice. 
 
Drengson (1995) also uses the notion of technological practice when developing his 
ecophilosophical approach to the study of technology. By studying practices, he 
identifies different stages of technology, ranging from that of hunter-gatherers to 
agriculture, to industrial and information technology practice. In the descriptions of 
these stages, it becomes evident how technological practice is a product of its time 
and place, and how diverse degrees of technology can be identified. 
 
So, to interpret technology as practice is to first acknowledge that technological 
practice varies in degree. While the definitions by practice scholars (e.g. Reckwitz, 
2002; Shove et al., 2012; Schatzki, 2014) give technology a central role in 
organising the social world, discussion about the degree of technology in practices 
seems to be implicit, or non-existent. The notion of degree means that practices are 
either higher technology or lower technology. For example, swimming in the ocean 
can be considered a less technological practice than swimming in a heated, human-
made and maintained pool. Second, conceptualising technology as practice, instead 
of assuming technology is just an element of practice, importantly broadens the 
analysis to include those activities that enable the specific technological practice 
being practised. For instance, in the case of swimming, the manufacturing and 
heating of the pool are such enabling and provisory practices. As most theories of 
social practice would readily limit their analysis to technologies in use, questions on 
closely related and conditional object-relations would attract less research attention 
(Rinkinen et al., 2015). This is not to say that theories of practice are silent on the 
questions of, for example, production and supply (e.g. R¿pke, 2009; Mylan, 2015), 
but it does indicate that the analyses have emphasised technology as merely a part of 
daily practice. Conceptualising technology as practice permits exploration of a 
broader analysis scope. To recognise the cumulative and overlapping character of 
technological practices is central to accessing the criteria of measurement for how 
technological, as well as how matter/energy intensive, a certain practice is. 
 
Lastly, the study of technology as practice does not lose sight of the essence of 
technology, the ontological realm of technology. To connect the technological 
practices back to the ontological sphere, it is arguable that the degree of technology 
depends on whether a specific practice leads to more or less Enframing. This is of 
course impossible to assess in terms of grades as the essence of technology implies a 
specific mode of thinking and Being. So albeit the degree of technology can only be 
assessed on the ontic level of practice, ontological attention may reveal some of the 
fundamental, inherent limitations and expected directions of technology. According 
to Heidegger ([1952-1962] 1977), it is an illusion of modernity to think in terms of 
technology merely as a practice without seeing the essence of technology underlying 
the activity. 
 
While an exponential increase in technology defines the history and present of the 
social world to a great extent, the continuation of such development is not 
predetermined. Contrary to what Heidegger ([1976] 1981) famously declared on the 
future on humanity, it is not only a God that can save us. Every situational action, 
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including a departure from technological practice, is potentially a new start and a 
catalyst for social change, as Schatzki (2014) stated. However, in order to 
understand who or what determines the degree and reach of technology in practice 
(and why), and the possibility of social change and degrowth, the present study turns 
to discussing the question of agency in technological practice. 
 
3.4. Moral Relevance in Agency and Technological Practice 
 
ÔThe pursuit of perfection and increasing power in technology practices, and the 
spread of technology throughout our culture, have now become so pervasive that it 
makes sense to call the twentieth century the Age of TechnologyÕ (Drengson, 1995, 
p. 86). While some may still consider technology something manageable and 
controllable, critical voices have declared the technological development to be 
autonomous and beyond human control (Ellul, [1954] 1973; Winner, 1977). For 
instance, ÔWas the Fukushima nuclear facility, say unit 3, controllable before the 
tsunami and uncontrollable only after it?Õ Vadn (2014, p. 1) promptly asks, also 
supporting the view that technological practice can become self-directed. 
 
According to sociologist and philosopher of technology, Jacques Ellul ([1954] 
1973), technology has, in fact, come to obey its own laws, proclaimed itself as an 
independent agent, and rejected all other reasoning, including traditional morality: 
 
The power and autonomy of technique are so well secured that it, in its turn, 
has become the judge of what is moral, the creator of a new morality. Thus, it 
plays a role of creator of a new civilization as well. This morality Ð internal to 
technique Ð is assured of not having to suffer from technique. In any case, in 
respect to traditional morality, technique affirms itself as an independent 
power. Man alone is subject, it would seem, to moral judgement. We no 
longer live in that primitive epoch in which things were good or bad in 
themselves. Technique in itself is neither, and can therefore do what it will. It 
is truly autonomous. (Ellul, [1954] 1973, p. 134). 
 
In a similar way to Heidegger, Ellul ([1954] 1973) also goes beyond the 
instrumental definition of technology and sees modern technology as a totalising 
phenomenon imposed on human activity that follows the single principle of efficient 
ordering of things. Technological instruments and the practice of technology have 
certainly changed the way humans perceive and encounter things, be they objects 
labelled as belonging to the human, animal, vegetable or mineral realms. Verbeek 
(2006), for instance, neatly illustrates how technological instruments are providing 
answers to ethical questions of how to act through the design of products and 
processes: 
 
Technologies are able to evoke certain kinds of behavior: a speed bump can 
invite drivers to drive slowly because of its ability to damage a carÕs shock 
absorbers, a car can demand from a driver that he or she wear the safety belt 
by refusing to start if the belt is not used, and a plastic coffee cup has the 
script Òthrow me away after use,Ó whereas a porcelain cup ÒasksÓ to be 
cleaned and used again (Verbeek, 2006, p. 362). 
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This example also demonstrates how thin the line between the categories of 
technological instruments and practice really is. Technological instruments Ð as non-
human agents Ð are able to direct change in practice by means of supporting a 
certain kind of behaviour over another. But despite the realisation that technology 
can, and has, gained agency in todayÕs societies, it is difficult to recognise how 
technology (whether examined as an instrument, a practice or any other 
phenomenon) could become fully autonomous, as suggested by Ellul ([1954] 1973) 
and Winner (1977). 
 
From the technology as practice point of view, the agential autonomy of 
technological instruments is difficult to adopt, as it would denote that they are 
independent of all other elements of practice. As theorised earlier, while non-human 
agents may have agency, it is always entrenched in situational practices, and the 
human-made always exists in relation to the non-human (see Latour, 2009; Schatzki, 
2014). Moreover, the assumption that humans would be able to create a fully 
autonomous technological device is not empirically valid and seems to over-
estimate human engineering capacity. In fact, statements expressing ungrounded 
self-confidence in human technological skills are hubristic, and hence dangerous 
(von Wright, 1978). As Drengson (1995, p. 48) put it: 
 
Saying that technology becomes autonomous implies that it takes on a life of 
its own. However, it has such a life only as a projection of our own shadows. 
Technology only appears to have its own inner life, dynamic, and logic. In 
reality it is driven by our own subconscious intelligence, and the crafty ego of 
its makers. These makers can be unaware that the ÒautonomyÓ of technology 
is only a projection of the shadowy fragments of a larger self. This larger Self 
is hidden because the small self (ego) is not completely integrated with the 
whole context and is still engaged in defensive maneuvers.  
 
In addition, to consider technological practice autonomous is quite troublesome as, 
according to Schatzki (2014), practices are always intertwined with other bundles of 
practices and hence have no clear boundaries. Thus, to say that a practice is 
independent of other practices loses its grounds. Each technological practice is not 
only dependent on the all-previous technological practices but also on other 
coexisting practices that are unfolding simultaneously. As reviewed previously, 
every Ôaction is a concrete synthesis, shaped and conditioned, on the one hand, by 
the temporal-relational contexts of action and, on the other, by the dynamic element 
of agency itselfÕ (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p. 1004). 
 
However, technological instruments Ô[É] can both act by themselves in varied 
independence and structurally shape human agencyÕ (Heikker, [2012] 2014, p. 28), 
as technological practice can direct thinking in the direction of Enframing, as well as 
change behaviour. As Carlile et al. (2013, p. 8) note, Ôany form of agency is made 
all the more poignant by the fact that its consequences will be made material and can 
last over timeÕ, as in the case of a nuclear disaster, for example. An uncontrollable 
explosion in an atomic energy reactor shapes the affected human and non-human 
agency by setting limits to which doings and sayings can be performed, if any (in 
the case of fatalities). 
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It seems pertinent to establish that technology defined as an instrument has an 
agency, while technology theorised as a practice embeds an agency. The agency of, 
and in, technology, however, is neither fully free nor determined, but only holds a 
degree of autonomy that is contingent on its context. Following SchatzkiÕs (2002, p. 
210) train of thought, it could then be suggested that social change is made in the 
ceaseless advance of technological and non-technological agents. And when agency 
is entrenched in the technological practice, the opening for change lies in the 
emergence, reproduction, and disappearance of the practices performed by the 
agents (Schatzki, 2014). 
 
Even if technological instruments can assert a degree of agency, they do not meet 
the criteria of moral agents, as Ôto be a moral agent is to have the potentiality for 
living and acting in a state of tension or, if need be, conflict between two moral 
points of viewÕ (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 318; also 1981). Neither a machine, nor a 
hammer, has this potentiality. Furthermore, the lack of morality in the agency of 
technological instruments is showed by their inability to make judgements and 
situational decisions instance by instance, which is considered a necessary condition 
for ethical conduct (Introna, 2009). The same deficiencies apply somewhat to the 
technological practice. Rather than enabling its agents to deliberate on the issue of 
good and right (in a specific time and place), a technological practice directs the 
performance towards clarifying, arranging, and rationalising, as well as integrating 
objects, by aiming to bring efficiency to everything (Ellul, [1954] 1973; Drengson, 
1995). In the technological practice, the world not only unfolds as a standing-reserve 
in the minds of its human agents but the agency in technology is also geared towards 
an active, universal utilisation of objects. 
 
With this single aim of transforming by means of ordering (Ellul, [1954] 1973) and 
creating (Meagher, 1988) the world, technological practice does not support the 
emergence of moral human agency. However, what the technological practice does 
enable is the calculative deliberation on the different points of view as long as they 
are within the essence of technology: Enframing. In other words, technological 
practice allows people to ask questions with moral relevance, such as what to do 
with the standing-reserve, but it does not support its practitioners to work outside 
this frame where the world does not unfold as a means to an end. 
 
While the technological practice does not offer an exit from instrumentalisation, it 
does corrupt its agents to varying degrees. It seems that the less technological the 
practice is, the less instrumentalisation characterises the agency; but by definition, 
technological practice does and cannot support the emergence of a kind of agency 
that either does or can let anything just be. Actually, it seems that the embedded 
agency in technological practice is insatiable in this respect. It constantly craves for 
more reordering of objects through its inherent determination to constantly calculate 
and make things from other things. Yet these actions often Ôhave a certain moral 
authority because they are taken to impose objectivity and neutrality in a complex 
domain that is already loaded with moral significanceÕ (Introna, 2015, p. 23). 
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3.5. Invitation to Releasement 
 
With technological practice, human agents have come to exert a global-scale force 
on the ecosystem (Barnosky et al., 2011) leading to unforeseen rates of extinction of 
non-human species, and consequently also to human agents jeopardising the 
existence of humanity itself (Barnosky et al., 2012). In line with Introna (2009, p. 
28), one Ôcould argue that it is morally unacceptable to create things that enrol us 
into programmes that ultimately damage our environment or our fellow human 
beingsÕ, as technological practices currently do. Ongoing development calls for a 
radically alternative way of thinking about ethics (Introna, 2009) to guide social 
practices. 
 
The present ethos of technocapitalist societies could be described as plutocentric due 
to the advocacy of economic growth over social and ecological concerns, but also as 
technocentric due to the strong belief in technological solutions (Ketola, 2010). 
What unites these two modes of ethics is anthropocentrism, the Ôview that the non-
human world has value only because, and insofar as, it directly or indirectly serves 
human interestsÕ (McShane, 2007, p. 170). Both the epistemic anthropocentrism, 
which considers humans as the only sources of value (or the only valuers), as well as 
the moral anthropocentrism, which considers humans as the only locus of inherent 
moral value, are problematic. In a similar way to humanism that Ôproclaims the 
Òright of manÓ and reduces everything else to the status of commodityÕ 
(Zimmerman, 1983, p. 100), anthropocentrism elevates the human species over other 
beings. By doing so, the anthropocentric view grants ethical legitimacy to seeing the 
non-human world as a standing-reserve for human ends, and as McShane (2007, p. 
179) notes, it Ôrule[s] out certain ways of caring as inappropriate to non-human 
objectsÕ. Zimmerman (1983) even proposes that regarding objects merely in 
instrumental terms prevents humans from understanding the essence of objects. But 
most obviously an anthropocentric approach to ethics fails Ôbecause it assumes that 
we can, both in principle and in practice, draw a definitive boundary between the 
objects (them) and usÕ (Introna, 2009, p. 31). These points direct enquiry towards a 
non-anthropocentric ethos that allows the human and the non-human worlds to 
peacefully coexist and prosper on their own terms.3 
 
Zimmerman (1983; 1994) and Introna (2009) have suggested that HeideggerÕs 
([1959] 1966) notion of Gelassenheit (releasement) could serve as a basis for the 
needed morality. Peculiarly, Heidegger himself was as much a critic of technology 
as he was of traditional morality. He was concerned that the very idea of morals 
could reproduce the thinking inherent in the technological practice, where humans 
act towards an aim in a utilitarian sense. Releasement applied as an ethos is, 
however, still distant from any conventional ideas of morality. Borrowing the term 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Zimmerman (1983, p. 102) suggests that ÔHeidegger would agree that a nonanthropocentric 
conception of humanity and its relation to the natural order must go beyond the doctrine of rights 
[É]: Proper behavior towards beings can only follow from right understanding of what beings are.Õ 
However, whether ZimmermanÕs interpretation is accurate is questionable, as the category of 
anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric is not employed in the works of Heidegger. 
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from a mystic, Meister Eckhart, HeideggerÕs releasement offers exactly a break 
from calculative thinking that has led humanity deep into technological practice: 
 
This letting-go means that we keep ourselves awake for releasement which, on 
the other side, means that we open ourselves to something, a ÔmysteryÕ that 
[...] is actually be-ing itself, and is that which lets us in into Gelassenheit. 
(Dalle Pezze, 2006, p. 1) 
 
For Heidegger, this mystery is Ôhidden in the technological worldÕ (Dahlstrom, 
2013, p. 121) and hence Ôhumanity on Earth remains in danger of technology so 
beguiling that calculative thinking remains the only sort of thinking in use, the only 
sort of thinking that countsÕ (ibid, p. 122). Only with meditative (rather than 
calculative) thinking, human agents can release themselves from technological 
practice and create spaces for new modes of relating, closer to Being itself. 
Heidegger ([1959] 1966, p. 52Ð53) explains this meditativeness and its relationship 
with technology as follows: 
 
Is man, then, a defenseless and perplexed victim at the mercy of the irresistible 
superior power of technology? He would be if man today abandons any 
intention to pit meditative thinking decisively against merely calculative 
thinking. But once meditative thinking awakens, it must be at work unceasingly 
and on every last occasion [É]. For here we are considering what is threatened 
especially in the atomic age: the autochthony of the works of man. 
 
Thus we ask now: even if the old rootedness is being lost in this age, may not a 
new ground and foundation be granted again to man, a foundation and ground 
out of which manÕs nature and all his works can flourish in a new way even in 
the atomic age? 
 
What could the ground and foundation be for the new autochthony? Perhaps the 
answer we are looking for lies at hand; so near that we all too easily overlook it. 
For the way to what is near is always the longest and thus the hardest for us 
humans. This is the way of meditative thinking. Meditative thinking demands of 
us not to cling one-sidedly to a single idea, nor to run down a one-track course 
of ideas. Meditative thinking demands of us that we engage ourselves with what 
at first sight does not go together at all. 
 
While Introna (2009, p. 42) considers that an ethos of letting be is impossible, he 
remarks that it Ôis exactly the impossibility that leads us to keep decisions open, to 
listen, to wait, and to reconsider again and again our choices Ð to let things beÕ. This 
dependence on both calculative and meditative thinking is made evident when 
examining practices related to meeting basic needs. For instance, dwelling 
necessitates technological practice and instruments, as well as calculative thinking, 
to some extent. That is, in human life, not all objects can be released from their use, 
and be subject to mere meditative thinking. Some clarity, arrangement, and 
rationalisation, as well as integration and efficiency, are needed in those everyday 
practices crucial to human existence. 
 
The dilemma, however, is that the technological practice does not support 
meditative thinking but rather encourages the calculative mind-set to dominate. This 
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is evident, for example, in the so-called micro-collapses when a technological 
practice is disrupted. As the technological practice alters from high technology to 
low technology Ð for instance, in the face of power cuts when centralised energy 
provision is replaced with localised low-tech solutions such as wood stoves Ð new 
spaces unfold for reflection and change (Rinkinen, 2013). This may be due to more 
time, a change in tempo, or an increase in autonomy and the altered possibilities for 
object control. What is important here is that the (often unexpected) collapses of 
technological systems imply that refraining from the technological practice Ð either 
intentionally or by accident Ð is indeed necessary for a non-technologically 
dominated ethos and practice to emerge. 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Conceptualising technology as practice has enabled the current research to look 
beyond technology as an instrument by broadening the scope of analysis to the 
essence of the technological phenomenon (Heidegger, ([1952Ð1962] 1977). The 
practice lens applied to technology (Drengson, 1995; Schatzki, 2002) also led to 
identifying degrees of technology, suggesting that practices can be characterised by 
lower technology or higher technology. Varying approaches can be used in assessing 
the degree of technology, but for the present enquiry, the rate of throughput is 
decisive. When estimating the throughput necessary to any practice, the analysis 
ought to take into account all the phases of technological practice, that is, the life 
cycle of a practice. It is of course impossible to arrive at a number for a specific 
technology, as technological development is cumulative (Drengson, 1995) and the 
boundaries of practice are in constant flux (Schatzki, 2002). A further complication 
results from the multitude of rebound effects in both time and place that forever 
escape measurement (Finnveden, 2000; Binswanger, 2001). An intuitively plausible 
rule of thumb would suggest that the humbler the technological practice in terms of 
the instruments used, the less ecological damage is caused. The practice of shelter 
building, for instance, is undoubtedly lower in terms of its throughput when 
operated with ÔconvivialÕ tools rather than machines (Illich, [1973] 2009) and fewer 
of ÔexosomaticÕ instruments4 (Georgescu-Roegen, 1975). 
 
4.1. The Effect of Technological Instruments and Practice on Throughput 
 
In terms of instruments used in the practice of technology, it goes without saying 
that use of the endosomatic rather than exosomatic instruments would have the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 ÔApart from a few insignificant exceptions, all species other than man use only endosomatic 
instruments Ð as Alfred Lotka proposed to call those instruments (legs, claws, wings, etc.), which 
belong to the individual organism by birth. Man alone came, in time, to use a club, which does not 
belong to him by birth, but which extended his endosomatic arm and increased its power. At that 
point in time, manÕs evolution transcended the biological limits to include also (and primarily) the 
evolution of exosomatic instruments, i.e., of instruments produced by man but not belonging to his 
body. That is why man can now fly in the sky or swim under water even though his body has no 
wings, no fins, and no gills.Õ (Georgescu-Roegen, 1975, p. 369) 
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desired consequences of decreasing the throughput of a practice. Walking instead of 
riding a bike or driving a motor vehicle is ecologically more sensible, as is talking 
(face-to-face) instead of speaking on the phone or via Skype. This does not have to 
signify that humans have to stay where they were born but would certainly set some 
limitations to the ongoing mobility craze. On a larger scale, desisting from using 
ÔadvancedÕ exosomatic instruments would mean that humans lose access to some of 
the matter/energy use (e.g. fossil fuels), which is desirable from the ecological 
perspective. The longer artificial arms become, the deeper humans can drill into the 
EarthÕs crust. Furthermore, the more machines and systems evolve, the more 
humans tend to lose their agency in the vagaries of ever-more complex technological 
societies (Ellul, [1954] 1973; Winner, 1977). 
 
If technological practice is given the ever-expanding role it craves, objects become 
more ÔcyborgianÕ and the boundaries between made and born entities, anthromes 
and biomes, as well as between the natural and the artificial, continue to blur. That 
is, technological practice leads to dangerous homogeneity in both a cultural and an 
ecological sense, as the ambition of the practice is exactly about transforming 
objects to obey the laws of the human calculated order. Most societies are already 
deeply technological (Ellul, [1954] 1973; Winner, 1977) and the rationale for 
ecological conservation (i.e. the releasement of phusis) is attacked. In the modern 
world characterised by the technological practice, there is little ÔnatureÕ left (as 
noted by several post- and eco-modernisation theorists), and hence also no objects to 
be considered ÔnaturalÕ (or ÔwildÕ or ÔorganicÕ) that would need to be conserved or 
released from the technological practice. 
 
It surely is true that things are assuming more and more hybridity, as Ô[hum]an-
made objects are crowding out the environmentÕ (Daly, 2005, p. 100). When 
thinking about this, it is important to remember that it is precisely the technological 
practice that is behind this change. Every engagement in the technological practice 
intensifies the accumulated throughput, the overall amount of objects transformed 
through human instruments and hands5. That is, as technology is practised, objects 
are forced to travel past the social sphere and transformed into a new state to benefit 
the human species, but not necessarily the whole. (This practice is legitimised by the 
anthropocentric ethic). In entropic terms, this means the technological practice 
always results in a deficit, as Ôthe cost of any biological or economic enterprise is 
always greater than the productÕ (Georgescu-Roegen, [1970] 2011, p. 52). Further, 
the greater the degree of a technological practice the greater the deficit. A lesser 
technological practice, again, allows a larger number of objects exist outside the use. 
 
4.2. Implications of Releasement for Degrowth 
 
An alternative practice that goes beyond modern technology is surely necessary for 
the twenty-first century. ÔWe need a new way of understanding Being, a new ethos, 
that lets beings manifest themselves not merely as objects for human ends, but as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 It is worthwhile to note that endosomatic evolution also increases entropy but the amount and speed 
is far lower than with exosomatic evolution. 
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intrinsically importantÕ (Zimmerman, 1983, p. 99), and releasement offers this. 
Heidegger posits that Ôwe should respect all beings not because they resemble 
humans, not because they are valued by humans, not because they are experienced 
by humans, but because they are what they areÕ (ibid, p. 122). Zimmerman (1994, 
p. 132) explains the practical implications of releasement as follows: 
 
First, it means not unduly interfering with things. Second, it means taking care 
of things, in the sense of making it possible for them to fulfill their potential. 
Third, letting be involves not just the ontical work of tending to things, but 
also the ontological work of keeping open the clearing through which they can 
appear. 
 
According to Heidegger ([1959] 1966, p. 55), releasement Ôgrant[s] us the 
possibility of dwelling in the world in a totally different wayÕ. In the current 
situation where technological practices continue to have severe ecological 
consequences (e.g. Drengson, 1995; Parkes, 2003), it seems that the transition to 
degrowth necessitates the ethos of releasement to a large extent. An ethos for 
degrowth must be strongly connected to a frame of thought that allows non-human 
objects to unfold not as a standing-reserve but on their own, and hence manifest 
their complex genesis. 
 
One way to releasement could be to cease to partake in those practices where the 
essence of technology dominates. Participation in technological practice, including 
its calculative mode of thinking, reinforces the embedded agency for more 
technological change. This signifies a shift from active engagement in multifarious 
technological practices that necessitate a global production and distribution network 
to ÔconvivialityÕ (Illich, [1973] 2009), which is rooted in a region. ÔThe region 
gathers Ð just as if nothing were happening [gleich als ob sich nichts ereigne] Ð each 
to each and everything to everything else, gathering all into an abiding while resting 
in itselfÕ (Heidegger, [1944] 2010, p. 74). Openness to releasement through 
meditative thinking may denote not only a change in the degree of technological 
practice and instruments (quantity) and the kind of technology (quality)6, but may 
also unfold as ÔatechnologyÕ. 
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6 A solar panel, for instance, is certainly a different instrument in terms of its quality than a coal plant 
but the quantity is a key issue for matter/energy throughput. Because of the physical base of our 
existence, even solar panels cannot be produced without limits. A single coal plant on the planet is 
not a problem but a billion factories manufacturing solar panels certainly would be. Based on this 
rationale, it could be suggested that for degrowth it is ultimately a question of quantity. For 
Heidegger, however, a central question was quality: the unlocking of energy. ÔThe revealing that 
rules in modern technology [É] puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that 
can be extracted and stored as suchÕ (Heidegger, [1952-1962] 1977, p. 14). An old windmill, for 
example, does not do this as Ôits sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the windÕs 
blowingÕ (ibid). It appears that Heidegger did not see the matter/energetic limits of building 
windmills. 
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Releasement offers a plateau for new ethics to emerge, but the interpretations and 
conceivable political consequences warrant careful consideration and must be 
implemented with caution. As Zimmerman (1983, p. 102) put it: 
 
Humanists would argue that it is politically dangerous to abandon the 
principle of human rights in favor of the obscure notion that we should Òlet 
things be,Ó while some radical environmentalists would maintain that 
Heidegger himself remains a humanist because he overestimates the 
importance of the human beingÕs supposedly unique ability to speak. 
 
At first, it is possible to think that this alternative ethos that calls for letting things be 
may lead to passivity in the face of injustice Ð be it the recurrence of fascism in 
Europe, the global march of neoliberal capitalism, or the extensive destruction of 
speciesÕ habitats. However, as Heidegger ([1944] 2010, p. 70) himself notes in 
Country Path Conversations, the releasement of things lays Ôoutside the [very] 
distinction between activity and passivityÕ. Maybe it is possible to talk about 
deliberate inaction or active passivity in the case of an ethos for encountering the 
non-human world. This is because, in order to reduce matter/energy throughput, it is 
exactly the collective refraining from Ð and ceasing of Ð technological practice that 
is indispensable. To have a degrowth society, a great volume of fossil fuels must be 
left in the ground, a vast portion of forests must be left to grow, and most fish must 
be left in the oceans. For the ecology to recover, human activity must shrink. 
 
An answer to an important question of Ôdoes the degrowth movement need 
technologyÕ begins to take shape. Is there a need for more clarification and 
arrangement, calculation and assessment, as well as more organisation, 
rationalisation, mechanisation, computation, digitalisation, artificialisation, and 
integration of objects with the predefined aim of having control and bringing 
efficiency and order to everything? The short answer is ÔnoÕ. ÔUnder this regime [of 
technology] the mechanistically defined world becomes primarily a storehouse of 
raw material and a source of power for the engines of industry to turn out 
commodities and services for the marketÕ (Drengson, 1995, p. 88). It is hence 
somewhat evident that a degrowth society needs neither technology as a general 
frame that manifests in the increasingly technological practice nor new instruments. 
The world is already full of tools and artefacts for dwelling. In fact, the converse can 
be considered the case. In order to reach degrowth in terms of decreased 
matter/energy throughput, practices must shift away from technology. Releasement 
is the only way out of technology (Heidegger, [1952-1962] 1977). 
 
Given the prevailing unsustainability, the study suggests that expectations of 
technology as a means to deliver ecologically sensible change are reconsidered in a 
critical light. Consequently, the paper calls for humans to refrain from the 
technological frame and practice. While this is difficult, because most of us are 
deeply entrenched in the routines and habits of technological society, there is always 
an opportunity for change. Schatzki (2007, p. 17) explains this constant flow of 
opportunities: 
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[...] each present activity is potentially a new start, potentially itself a change 
or the beginning of change. Whether present activity is a new start depends on 
what is done and how others react to this. 
 
Moreover, it follows that, similarly to ethics, meditative thinking cannot be above or 
detached from practices, but must rather unfold within the plenum of practices (e.g. 
Schatzki, 2002; Introna, 2009). 
 
4.3. Limitations and Further Enquiries 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, the rationale offered in the paper would probably be a re-
enactment of technological thinking for Heidegger, as it describes things in terms of 
their purpose or aim. This paper claimed that in order to attain degrowth in terms of 
decreased matter/energy throughput, practices must shift away from technology. 
This statement that seems to contradict itself and yet might be true (or wrong at the 
same time), could be considered a limitation. 
 
To problematise the claim even further (from the very framework of the paper) is to 
remark that this paper (as an object) is also human-made, which means that the 
process of making the claim has caused an increase in the cumulative throughput. In 
fact, quite a lot of matter/energy was first perceived as a standing-reserve and then 
used in order to complete the study. In the practice of letting be, fewer academic 
articles and arguments are undoubtedly needed and created, as meditativeness is 
even beyond language, the chief human-made object. Releasement leads to stillness 
and meditative presence. That being so, this study should not be taken as an example 
of practising releasement, or even a Heideggerian interpretation of technology. 
Building on the works of, inter alia, Heidegger, this study presents a viewpoint on 
the relationship between technology and degrowth. 
 
As the motivation and focus of the paper was on built on the minimalist definition of 
degrowth, namely the reduction of matter/energy throughput, it is important to 
acknowledge additional limitations of the approach. ÔBeing concerned with resource 
scarcity, or with ecosystem destruction, but not with world justice can lead to top-
down anti-population proposals and anti-immigration discourseÕ (Demaria et al., 
2013, p. 206). The present study by no means seeks to put forward an eco-fascist 
message, in fact, quite the opposite. Refraining from technological practice is 
perceived as a way of ensuring that any form of totalitarian organisation is 
ungovernable. As the present and history so vividly demonstrate, transition to, as 
well as maintenance of, a fascist regime would almost certainly need technology. In 
fact, totalitarianism and fascism can be seen as manifestations of the very essence of 
technology. But how can a radical confinement to a region, which is almost an 
inevitable consequence of moving to a lower degree of technological practice and 
the use of less exosomatic instruments, not end up being a form of exclusive 
localism defined by intra-species conflicts? This is a central question for the future 
enquiries into technology and degrowth, where it would be worthwhile to maintain 
the locus of attention on exploring the practice of releasement. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
It is interesting, and possibly ironic, that humans have survived precisely because 
they have adapted their environment by means of technological practice instead of 
simply becoming adapted to it, but now it is observable that the transformation of 
the non-human world humans have brought about is jeopardising human survival. 
 
This paper asked what technology is and how apt technology is to prompt degrowth. 
Technology was defined as Enframing, a mode of being, which manifests in the 
technological practice of different degrees. Rather than strictly saying ÔyesÕ or ÔnoÕ 
to technology, the question concerning technological practice for degrowth seems to 
largely be a question of degree. Are there not too many non-human objects being 
transformed into human-made ones in the technological practice with too many 
technological instruments? As ecosystems collapse around us, there is a wealth of 
empirical evidence to support the view that the human species has gone too far in 
terms of transforming the environment. To reach degrowth in terms of decreased 
matter/energy throughput, practices must be geared away from the technological 
frame of thought to a considerable extent. 
 
This study reached the conclusion that technological practice does not support the 
transition to degrowth as it directs its agents towards the continuous transformation 
of non-human-made objects into human-made objects. In a manner problematic to 
the quest of ecologically sensible change, which requires degrowth, the 
transformation of objects (undertaken in the technological practice) signifies an 
increase in cumulative throughput. The more technological the practice, the fewer 
things are released for use. Even the transformation of existing man-made objects 
into new objects (recycling) needs matter/energy and contributes to the overall 
metabolic load on the Earth. Hence, contrary to ideas about ecological 
modernisation, the paper suggests that an increase in the degree of technological 
practice signifies an increase in matter/energy throughput. Therefore, the study 
strongly challenges the dominant position of modern technology as a means for 
ecological change, and calls for refraining from technological practice by means of 
the new ethos: releasement. 
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